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ADVERSE SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE:
DEAD OR ALIVE?
The adverse spousal privilege' developed at common law to enable a
defendant to prevent his spouse from testifying against him in a criminal
trial. In Trammel v. United States,2 the Supreme Court apparently abol-
ished this privilege by vesting the privilege solely in the witness spouse.
Commentators interpret Trammel to allow only a witness spouse to
invoke the adverse spousal privilege. If the witness spouse is willing to
testify, the defendant spouse cannot prevent such testimony.3 This Note
asserts that Trammel does not extend that far. Instead, courts should
grant the defendant spouse the right to challenge the voluntariness of
adverse spousal testimony, thereby restoring some semblance of the
spousal privilege.
Part I of this Note provides the historical basis for the adverse spousal
privilege.4 Part II raises questions that Trammel did not resolve. Part
I. The adverse spousal privilege is commonly referred to as the "marital privilege." This Note
uses the two terms interchangeably. For a detailed history of this privilege, see generally 8 J. WIG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2227 (1961).
2. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
3. See, eg., Note, Evidence-The Marital Privilege, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 455, 456 ("[T]he
Supreme Court [in Trammel] held that the witness spouse alone could make the decision whether or
not to testify."); Note, Evidence-Privilege Regarding Non-Confidential Marital Testimony is Vested
Only in Witness Spouse, 11 CuM. L. REv. 465, 468 n.21 (1980).
Commentators criticized Trammel, claiming the decision facilitates prosecutorial abuse and pro-
motes fundamental unfairness. See, e.g., Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IowA L.
REV. 725, 730, 737 (1981) (Trammel will result in prosecutorial abuse and fundamental unfairness);
see also Note, Evidence-Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony, 55 TUL. L. REv. 961, 969
("One potential outcome of this decision is the possibility of government abuse by the overzealous
prosecutor.").
4. This Note addresses the marital privilege in the context of criminal litigation. Use of the
privilege in civil cases is not within the scope of this Note. See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531,
544 (7th Cir. 1977) (the rehabilitation rationale underlying the privilege in criminal cases is not
applicable in civil cases). In addition, use of other family privileges and use of the privilege against
confidential marital communications are not within the scope of this Note. For a discussion of
various family privileges, see In re Mathews, 714 F.2d 223 (2nd Cir. 1983) (grand jury witness may
not invoke family privilege to avoid incriminating in-laws); United States v. Jones, 633 F.2d 817 (4th
Cir. 1982) (adult grand jury witness may not invoke family privilege to avoid answering certain
questions about father); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) (parent-child privilege
prohibits forcing child to testify against father).
For a discussion of the privilege against confidential marital communications, see, e.g., United
States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing between adverse spousal privi-
lege and privilege against confidential marital communications); see also R. CARLSON, E. IM-
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III traces the common-law development of a defendant's right to object
to coerced confessions and testimony. Finally, Part IV concludes that
even after Trammel, a defendant spouse should have the right to chal-
lenge the voluntariness of a witness spouse's testimony.
I. MARITAL PRIVILEGES: HISTORY, TYPES, AND EXCEPTIONS
A. Historical Development
The marital privilege originated at early English common law. In Bent
v. Allot,5 decided over four centuries ago, an English court first recog-
nized a defendant's right to prevent his wife from testifying against him.
Shortly after Bent, another English court held that a prosecutor could
not elicit testimony from a defendant's wife in a bankruptcy proceeding.6
Later, Lord Coke recognized this privilege in one of his commentaries, 7
noting that a wife can not testify for or against her husband.'
History provides a variety of rationales for the marital privilege. The
traditional rationale was the notion that husband and wife are a single
legal entity, and therefore, one cannot testify against the other.9 The
modem explanation for the privilege rests on the policy argument that
society desires to preserve marriage,'0 foster family peace," and avoid
WINKELRIED, & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 116 (1983) (referring to
"two separate and distinct doctrines applicable to spousal testimony").
5. 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (1580). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2227, at 211 (referring to
Bent as "the earliest explicit ruling" on the privilege).
6. See 1 Brown & Gold 47, 123 Eng.- Rep. 656 (1613) (common law provides that the prosecu-
tion may not examine the wife of the bankrupt against her husband). Several decades later, an
English court recognized one exception to the marital privilege recognized in The Lord Audley's
Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1141 (1631) ("[I]n a case of a common person, between party and party
she could not [be a witness against her husband].. .but between the king and the party.. .she may [be
a witness against her husband]."). See also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228, at 213 n.9 (discussing
The Lord Audley's Case).
7. See COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628).
8. Application of the adverse spousal privilege has arisen almost exclusively in situations in-
volving a defendant husband preventing a witness wife from testifying. See Lempert, supra note 3, at
727 ("[Spousal immunity] has almost always been used to bar the testimony of wives against their
husbands. Of the hundreds of cases I have seen.. .only a handful involve men in a position to
incriminate their wives."). But see Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935) (husband
testified against wife charged with check forgery).
9. See Davis v. Dinwoody, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241 (1792); Winham v. Chetwynd, 1 Burrows 414
(K.B. 1757). See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228, at 215 (when the common law binds a man
and his wife together as one, no individual shall part them).
10. See, e-g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980) ("The modem justification for
this privilege against adverse spousal testimony is its perceived role in fostering the harmony and
sanctity of the marriage relationship.").
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the repugnance associated with one spouse contributing to the other's
imprisonment., 2
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged the marital privi-
lege in St~in v. Bowman. 3 In Stein, the prosecution introduced as evi-
dence a widow's deposition that her husband had accepted a bribe.1 4
While recognizing various exceptions to the marital privilege, 5 the Court
noted that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony protected do-
mestic relations from public exposure and preserved family peace.1 6 The
Court concluded that the privilege applied even though the witness' hus-
band was deceased and there was no marriage to preserve.'
7
The Supreme Court's initial treatment of the marital privilege pre-
cluded a spouse from testifying either for or against a defendant spouse.
18
In the 1930s, the Court abandoned its position that a witness spouse was
incompetent to testify in favor of a defendant spouse.19 The privilege
against adverse spousal testimony, however, remained intact.2"
11. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958) ("The basic reason the law has
refused to pit wife against husband or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake
was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace.").
12. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228, at 217 (There exists "a natural repugnance in every
fair-minded person [regarding] compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other's
condemnation.").
13. 38 U.S. 209 (1839).
14. Id. at 211, 223.
15. The Court recognized the following exceptions to the marital privilege: treason, violence by
one spouse against the other, and confidential communications. Id. at 222.
16. "The rule... protects the domestic relations from exposure, [and] rests upon considerations
connected with the peace of families." Id. at 222-23.
17. Id. at 223.
18. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893) ("In this case the wife was not a compe-
tent witness either in behalf of, or against her husband; if he had brought her into court, neither he
nor the government could have put her upon the stand.").
19. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380 (1933) ("Whatever was the danger that an inter-
ested witness would not speak the truth... its effect has been minimized almost to the vanishing point
by the test of cross-examination, the increased intelligence of jurors, and perhaps other
circumstances.").
20. In Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934), the Court recognized that federal courts are
free to interpret witness competency rules based upon evolving common-law principles. Id. at 12.
Wolfie enabled federal courts to reevaluate periodically the validity of the marital privilege. Wo/fle
formed the basis of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Wolfle and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure opened the door for a split to develop between the circuits over a
defendant spouse's ability to bar a witness spouse's adverse testimony. At least three circuit courts
recognized a defendant spouse's privilege. See, eg., United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir.
1949) (wife not competent witness against husband charged with illegally transporting stolen
money), Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948) (wife not competent witness against
husband charged with improperly obtaining another's mail); Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3rd
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By the 1950s, federal and state courts and legislatures had crafted va-
rying exceptions to the marital privilege,21 resulting in its inconsistent
application.22 In 1958, the Supreme Court reconsidered a defendant's
right to bar adverse spousal testimony in an effort to standardize applica-
tion of the privilege. In Hawkins v. United States,23 the defendant was
accused of violating the Mann Act.24 The trial court allowed the defend-
ant's wife, a self-professed prostitute, to testify against her husband.25
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court may not
admit voluntary spousal testimony if the defendant spouse objects.26 The
Court thus rejected the Government's attempt to vest this privilege solely
in the witness spouse.
After Hawkins, the Supreme Court sent Congress the Proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, including Rule 5-05. Rule 5-05 would have codi-
fied Hawkins, enabling a federal criminal defendant to prevent his spouse
from testifying against him.27 Congress, however, rejected the Court's
Cir. 1935) (husband not competent witness against wife charged with forging checks). The Tenth
Circuit, however, adopted the view that a wife may testify against her husband in his criminal trial.
See, eg., Hawkins v. United States, 249 F.2d 735, 736 (10th Cir. 1957) (wife competent witness
against defendant husbad), af'fd, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir.
1935) (wife competent witness against husband in his criminal prosecution occurring after divorce).
21. See, eg., State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 S.W. 1106 (1894) (wife competent to testify
against husband charged with assaulting her). See generally Note, Competency of One Spouse to
Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential
Communications: Modem Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 362-67 (1952).
22. By 1952, thirteen states had adopted the marital privilege. Twenty-five states had recog-
nized the competency of spouses to testify against one another with respect to nonconfidential mari-
tal communications, but had granted either spouse an optional privilege. Ten states had entirely
eliminated the privilege. See Note, supra note 21, at 362-67.
23. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
24. Id. at 74.
25. Although the husband objected to his wife's testimony, the trial court allowed the prosecu-
tion to introduce the wife's testimony into evidence. Id. at 74-75. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held
that a witness spouse may testify over a defendant spouse's objections in a criminal case. Id. at 75.
The court alternatively argued that even if the witness spouse were not a competent witness, her
testimony was harmless to defendant. Id. at 79.
26. Id. at 75-79. The Court rejected the Tenth Circuit's alternative argument of harmless error,
stating that the witness spouse's testimony that she was a prostitute both before and after her mar-
riage might influence the jury's determination of the defendant's intent. Id. at 80.
27. Rule 5-05 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence read in full:
Husband-Wife Privilege:
(a) General Rule of Privilege. An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to
prevent his spouse from testifying against him.
(b) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in which one
spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other or of a child of
either, or with a crime against the person or property of a third person committed in the
course of committing a crime against the other, or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/8
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attempt to federalize privilege law.2 8 Instead, Congress adopted Rule
501, which grants federal courts authority to determine evidentiary rules
on a case-by-case basis guided by common-law principles.29 Subse-
quently, state judicial and legislative action gradually continued to erode
the marital privilege?30 The Supreme Court again moved to clarify the
scope of the privilege.
B. Trammel v. United States
In Trammel v. United States,31 the Court modified Hawkins, vesting
the marital privilege in the witness spouse. In Trammel, Otis and Eliza-
beth Trammel allegedly brought heroin into the United States.32 Eliza-
beth later obtained additional heroin overseas. When she returned to the
United States, customs agents discovered the heroin and arrested her.
The Government indicted Otis and two others for importing heroin. 3
Drug Enforcement Administration agents persuaded Elizabeth to coop-
erate with the Government, granting her immunity in return for her tes-
timony at trial.34
marriage, or (3) in proceedings in which a spouse is charged with importing an alien for
prostitution or other immoral purpose in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328, or with transporting
a female in interstate commerce for immoral purposes or other offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424.
46 F.R.D. 161, 263 (1969).
28. See R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED, & E. KIONKA, supra note 4, at 116 (even though
rejected by Congress, "the proposed rules are instructive and have persuasive authority"). But see
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. at 47 ("In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting Rule 501,
Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege.").
29. Rule 501 reads in full:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act
of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdi-
vision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State Law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
30. For a comprehensive review of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and the marital
privilege in the post-Hawkinslpre-Trammel era, see generally Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Pre-
rogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital
Privilege, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1353 (1973); Note, Spousal Testimony, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 259
(1962) (Note prepared for New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial Laws).
31. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
32. Id. at 42.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 42-43.
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Prior to his trial, Otis attempted to prevent Elizabeth from appearing
as a witness by asserting the Hawkins privilege against adverse spousal
testimony. 35 The district court, however, permitted Elizabeth to testify
against Otis, and her testimony proved central to the Government's case.
The district court ultimately found Otis guilty. 6 The court of appeals
affirmed the conviction.37
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions,3 8 unanimously
holding that only a witness spouse may invoke the adverse spousal privi-
lege.3 9 If the witness spouse is willing to testify, "whatever the motiva-
tion," the defendant spouse can not prevent the testimony. 4 The Court
reached its conclusion for five principal reasons. First, commentators
had widely criticized the Hawkins rule.4 Second, Rule 501 evidenced
congressional intent to continue the evolutionary development of testi-
monial privileges.42 Third, recent state law trends had eroded the mari-
tal privilege. 3 Fourth, courts should strictly construe privileges because
society is entitled to "every man's evidence."' 44 Finally, if one spouse
willingly testifies against the other, there is probably little marital har-
mony to preserve.45
35. Id. at 43.
36. Id.
37. 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978).
38. Justice Burger delivered the Court's opinion, and Justice Stewart wrote a concurring
opinion.
39. The Trammel Court observed that the Hawkins rule, which excludes testimony related to
criminal acts and communications by the defendant in the presence of third persons, sweeps more
broadly than other testimonial privileges,. which exclude only confidential communications. 445
U.S. at 52. The Court then considered the trade-off between fostering family peace and fostering
justice. The Court balanced those competing interests, concluding that "[w]hen one spouse is willing
to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding-whatever the motivation-their relationship is
almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege
to preserve." Id. Finally, apparently in response to the question whether Elizabeth willingly testi-
fied, the Court stated that her testimony was not involuntary simply because she testified under
immunity and a promise of lenient treatment. Id. at 53.
40. Id. at 52. Trammel did not directly affect the privilege against confidential marital commu-
nications. Id. at 52 (the Court referred to the independent rule protecting confidential marital
communications).
41. 445 U.S. at 50 n.ll. The criticisms include direct authoritative commentary and implied
legislative disfavor, evidenced by Congress' rejection of Proposed Rule 5-05 and acceptance of Rule
501. See supra notes 27 & 29.
42. 445 U.S. at 47.
43. Id. at 49 n.9.
44. Id. at 50 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974), for the proposition
that testimonial privileges should be strictly construed).
45. Id. at 52.
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C Post-Trammel" Commentary and Judicial Responses
After Trammel, commentators expressed concern that the decision
would allow prosecutorial abuse and would unfairly treat the defendant
spouse.46
Federal courts, however, quickly adopted the Trammel holding,47 cit-
ing it as authority to erode other testimonial privileges 48 and to justify
exceptions to the marital privilege.4 9 State courts adopted Trammel
more slowly. Several state courts rejected Trammel, finding their state
statutory provisions inconsistent with the holding.50 Most state courts,
however, eventually adopted Trammel and cited the holding to govern
other testimonial privilege cases51 and to create exceptions to the marital
46. See supra note 3.
47. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338, 340 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982); Royal Embassy of Saudi
Arabia v. S.S. Mt. Dirfys, 537 F. Supp. 55, 56 (E.D. N.C. 1981); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp.
517, 522 (D. Del. 1981).
48. Several federal cases cite the Trammel rationale but distinguish the husband/wife relation-
ship. See, eg., In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 637 (6th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing husband/wife rela-
tionship from priest/penitent relationship); Doe v. United States, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983)
(distinguishing husband/wife relationship from psychiatrist/patient relationship); Somer v. Johnson,
704 F.2d 1473, 1479 (11th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing husband/wife relationship from doc-
tor/hospital relationship); United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2nd Cir. 1981) (same); In re
International Horizons, Inc., 16 Bankr. 484, 489 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (distinguishing hus-
band/wife relationship from accountant/client relationship).
49. The circuit courts are divided as to whether the adverse spousal privilege is subject to an
exception when the witness and the defendant are alleged substantial joint participants in the crime.
Compare United States v. Koecher, 755 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1985) (the joint participant exception
does not apply to the adverse spousal privilege in a grand jury proceeding), cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3190 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1985) (No. 84-1922) and Appeal of Malfitano, 633 F.2d 276 (3d Cir.
1980) (same) with United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983) (contra); Trammel v. United
States, 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978) (same), affd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); United
States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
50. See People v. Thompson, 111 Mich. App. 324, 314 N.W.2d 606 (1981) (citing Trammel for
insight into policy even though Trammel conflicts with Michigan statute); People v. Wadkins, 101
Mich. App. 272, 300 N.W.2d 542 (1980) (Michigan statute may preclude result reached in Tram-
mel); State v. Pendergras, 621 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (Missouri continues to recognize
adverse spousal privilege despite trend mentioned in Trammel); State v. Roberts, 633 P.2d 1214
(Mont. 1981) (Trammel applies only in federal court and is contrary to Montana statutory law);
Young v. State, 603 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (court unconvinced that Trammel should
determine privilege in Texas); State v. Evans, 287 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1982) (trial court erred in
holding Trammel affects West Virginia statute even if defendant and witness are divorced at time of
trial).
51. See, eg., Welfare Rights Org. v. Crisan, 33 Cal. 3d 766, 190 Cal. Rptr. 919, 661 P.2d 1072
(1982) (same); Dickenson v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 93, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1982) (attor-
ney/client); People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1982) (priest/penitent);
Law Offices of Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215 (Colo. 1982) (same); People v. Taylor, 618
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privilege.52 Neither federal nor state courts, however, have adequately
addressed several questions that Trammel failed to resolve.
II. TRAMMEL'S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The Trammel Court stated that if a witness spouse is willing to testify,
the defendant spouse can not prevent the testimony.53 The Court, how-
ever, failed to specify whether the defendant spouse may challenge the
willingness of the witness spouse to testify. If the defendant spouse can
pose such a challenge, the Court also failed to define what the defendant
spouse must show in order to prove the witness spouse's lack of willing-
ness to testify.
In order to answer these questions, it is helpful to review an analogous
line of cases concerning coerced confessions and testimony. In certain
circumstances, a defendant has the right to object to the voluntariness of
another individual's statement on the ground that the statement violates
P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1980) (physician/patient); Wender v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 434 A.2d 1372
(D.C. App. 1981) (attorney/client); In re Marriage of Gaumer, 303 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 1981) (psy-
chologist/patient); Commonwealth v. Clemons, 427 N.E. 2d 761 (Mass. App. 1981) (psychothera-
pist/patient); Greene v. New England Ins. Co., 108 Misc. 2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)
(physician/patient).
52. See, e.g., Osbourne v. State, 623 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1981) (no privilege if "eve-of-trial" mar-
riage); State v. Williams, 133 Ariz. 220, 650 P.2d 1202 (1982) (no privilege as to premarriage illegal
matters); People v. McGregor, 635 P.2d 912 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (crime against the other spouse
exception); State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 609 P.2d 1140 (1980) (no privilege if husband deserts
or does not support wife or child); Commonwealth v. Boarman, 610 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. App. 1980)
(child abuse exception); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983)
(civil action exception, even if spousal testimony highly destructive of the marriage), cert. denied sub
nom. Keefer v. Massachusetts, 104 S. Ct. 1421 (1984); People v. Love, 127 Mich. App. 596, 339
N.W.2d 493 (1983) (exception if witness spouse is victim of defendant spouse in single criminal event
for which defendant spouse is on trial, even if crime against witness does not reach same dimension
of criminality as crime against third party); People v. Thompson, 111 Mich. App. 324, 314 N.W.2d
606 (1981) (crime against the other spouse exception); State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d
421 (1980) (no privilege as to wife's testimony relating to husband's rape of another); Shults v. State,
96 Nev. 742, 616 P.2d 388 (1980) (no privilege as to wife's statement to policeman); In re Vitabile,
188 N.J. Super. 61, 455 A.2d 1151 (no privilege in nonaccusatory proceeding because no accused to
invoke the privilege), cert. denied, 95 N.J. 506, 468 A.2d 168 (1983); People v. D'Amato, 105
Misc.2d 1048, 430 N.Y.S.2d 521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (no privilege if witness wife was "virtual
prisoner" of defendant husband and marriage in "utter shambles"); People v. St. John, 74 A.D. 2d
85, 426 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (exception as to defendant's threat to rape daughter);
State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 276 S.E.2d 450 (1981) (no privilege if defendant accused of murder-
ing spouse's brother in spouse's presence); Brown v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 601, 292 S.E.2d 319
(1982) (crime against the other exception applies if one "integrated criminal transaction").
53. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the defendant's fourteenth amendment due process rights.5 4
III. COERCED CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY
A defendant's right to object to the evidentiary use of an involuntary
confession evolved from constitutional considerations. In Brown v. Mis-
sissippi," the Supreme Court held that a conviction based solely upon a
confession extracted by physical torture violates a defendant's due pro-
cess rights under the fourteenth amendment. 6 In Chambers v. Florida,57
the Court extended Brown by recognizing that a confession extracted by
mental torture also violates due process rights. 8
Courts note several justifications for excluding coerced confessions, in-
cluding the inherent lack of trust in the confession 59 and the desire to
discourage law enforcement officials from coercing confessions.60 In
Rogers v. Richmond,61 the Supreme Court noted that this exclusionary
rule serves the important function of protecting a defendant's exercise of
his free will.62
In Jackson v. Denno,63 the Supreme Court established a procedural
mechanism, referred to as a "Jackson v. Denno voluntariness hearing," to
ensure that involuntary confessions do not affect jury determinations of
guilt or innocence.64 By claiming that his confession was involuntary, a
defendant can require a separate hearing to determine the truth of his
claim.65 The voluntariness determination may not be made by the same
jury ultimately charged with determining the defendant's guilt or
innocence.66
In addition to a criminal defendant's ability to challenge the voluntari-
54. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
55. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
56. Id. at 287.
57. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
58. Id. at 235-41.
59. See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedure: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REV.
16, 19 (1953).
60. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1963).
61. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
62. Id. at 544.
63. 378 U.S. 368 (1963).
64. Id. at 377-96. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485 (1972) (Jackson procedure "designed
to safeguard the right of an individual, entirely apart from his guilt or innocence, not to be compelled
to condemn himself by his own utterances").
65. 378 U.S. at 391.
66. Id. at 391 n.19 (voluntariness to be determined by trial judge, another judge, or another
jury, but not by convicting jury).
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
518 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 63:509
ness of his own confession, a defendant may challenge the voluntariness
of another witness' testimony. In LaFrance v. Bohlinger,67 the defendant
claimed that a witness' out-of-court statement was involuntary and there-
fore inadmissible to impeach the witness' favorable in-court testimony.68
The First Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the defendant's argument,
holding that when a Jackson v. Denno voluntariness hearing produces
substantial evidence that threats and duress evoked a statement or con-
fession, courts must exclude the statement or confession.69 In addressing
the issue of the defendant's standing to challenge the voluntariness of the
witness' statement, the court explained that the defendant was asserting
his own, and not the witness', constitutional rights.70 The use of any
individual's involuntary testimony against a defendant violates the de-
fendant's due process rights to a fair trial.71
67. 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
68. The witness to the alleged crime claimed at trial that he had made earlier adverse state-
ments to the police "because he was strung out on drugs, frightened, and willing to say anything to
get back to his cell." Id. at 31.
69. "It is unthinkable that a statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging in a
police state should be admitted at the government's behest in order to bolster its case." Id. at 34.
See also Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. 271, 275 (D. R.I. 1981) (stating fundamental premise of
LaFrance as "refusal to permit Government to utilize in any way an involuntary statement" stem-
ming from "abhorrence of the official lawlessness").
70. 499 F.2d at 32-36. See Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. at 275 (LaFrance "emphasized that
the defendant's own due process rights were implicated by use of a witness' involuntary statement");
see also United States ex reL Cunningham v. DeRobertis, 719 F.2d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 1983) ("viola-
tion of another's fifth amendment rights may rise to the level of a violation of his own right to a fair
trial").
71. 499 F.2d at 35. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to LaFrance and has not considered
the issue whether a defendant may challenge the voluntariness of witness statements. 419 U.S. 1080
(1974). In addition to the First Circuit, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits arguably have approved
LaFrance. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Cunningham v. DeRobertis, 719 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1983);
Blackwell v. Franzen, 688 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1072 (1983); United States
v. Fredericks, 586 F.2d 470, 481 n.14 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979).
Other federal courts have cited LaFrance approvingly in the context of coerced confession cases.
See, e-g., United States v. Kearney, 682 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d
1139 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833 D.C. Cir. 1978); Rivera v. Warden,
Attica Correctional Facility, 431 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. N.Y. 1977).
Seven state jurisdictions have considered LaFrance. See, e.g., Chapman v. State, 302 So.2d 136,
138 n.1 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974) (no voluntariness determination required because issue not raised at
trial or on appeal); People v. Bates, 25 Ind. App. 3d 748, 324 N.E.2d 88 (1975) (limiting LaFrance to
voluntariness of testimony at trial only); Commonwealth v. Harris, 371 Mass. 462, 358 N.W.2d 982
(1976) (LaFrance requires jury consideration of voluntariness); Franklin v. State, 33 Md. App. 690,
336 A.2d 111 (dealing with the level of proof required for voluntariness determination), rey'd on
other grounds, 281 Md. 51, 375 A.2d 1116 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1018 (1978); State v. Lang-
ley, 25 N.C. App. 298, 212 S.E.2d 687 (citing LaFrance approvingly in context of coerced confession
case), cert. denied, 287 N.C. 467, 215 S.E.2d 627 (1975); State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St. 2d 316, 348
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/8
ADVERSE SPOUSAL PRIVILEGE
IV. THE ANSWERS TO TRAMMEL'S UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
A. The Defendant's Right to Challenge Voluntariness
LaFrance enabled a criminal defendant to challenge the voluntariness
of a witness' statement on due process grounds.7 2 Trammel held that a
defendant spouse can not prevent the testimony of a witness spouse who
is willing to testify, "whatever the motivation."7 3
At first glance, Trammel's holding seems to foreclose any inquiry into
what motivates a spouse to testify adversely. A closer look reveals this is
not the case. The Trammel Court stated its holding in the context of a
witness motivated by a grant of immunity and a promise of lenient treat-
ment.7 4 It is unlikely that the Trammel Court intended its "whatever the
motivation" language to encompass situations involving physical or
mental abuse.
If Trammel forecloses a defendant's inquiry into the voluntariness of a
witness spouse's adverse testimony, then Trammel should also foreclose
a defendant's inquiry into the voluntariness of a nonspousal witness' ad-
verse testimony.7 5 This result would overrule LaFrance in all situations,
even though Trammel did not consider LaFrance or the due process is-
sues LaFrance raised. Obviously, the Trammel Court did not intend
such a broad result. Even after Trammel, a defendant spouse retains the
right to challenge the voluntariness of a witness spouse's testimony.
Granting the defendant spouse the right to challenge the voluntariness
of adverse spousal testimony is consistent with Trammel's vesting the
spousal privilege solely in the witness spouse. If a separate Jackson v.
Denno voluntariness hearing determines that the witness spouse's testi-
mony is voluntary, the defendant spouse may not prevent the witness
spouse from testifying.
B. The Meaning of Voluntariness in the Trammel Context
A LaFrance voluntariness inquiry seeks to ensure witness credibility,
N.E.2d 351 (witness testimony is not inadmissible merely because of promise of immunity; only
violence, torture, and inhumane coercion render testimony untrustworthy and therefore inadmissi-
ble), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976).
72. 499 F.2d at 35.
73. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
74. See text accompanying supra note 34.
75. This conclusion could be avoided only by the illogical argument that the desire to eliminate
police brutality and to elicit truthful testimony is subject to diminution when the witness and defend-
ant are spouses.
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reliability, and trustworthiness.76 A defendant can show that a statement
was involuntary by proving that brutality, torture, or subtle police tech-
niques induced the statement.77 The question arises whether this La-
France voluntariness standard should also apply in the Trammel context.
This Note asserts that a more lenient standard should apply.
In addition to seeking to ensure witness credibility, reliability, and
trustworthiness, the Trammel Court sought to balance society's interest
in preserving marital harmony and family peace.7" The different pur-
poses behind the voluntariness inquiries in LaFrance and Trammel sug-
gest that the same voluntariness standard is not appropriate for both
settings.
The Trammel Court found that the witness spouse's testimony was
voluntary because there was probably no marital harmony and family
peace left to preserve.79 Therefore, the voluntariness standard in the
Trammel context should turn upon an inquiry into the level of marital
harmony and family peace remaining in the defendant and witness
spouses' marriage. If a sufficient degree of marital harmony and family
peace exists, the witness spouse's statement should be deemed involun-
tary, and the defendant spouse should have the right to exclude the testi-
mony on due process grounds. Of course, a witness spouse's statement
induced by brutality, torture, or subtle police techniques should also be
deemed involuntary in accordance with LaFrance.
V. CONCLUSION
Permitting a defendant spouse to challenge the voluntariness of ad-
verse spousal testimony will satisfy concerns of fundamental unfairness
and risk of prosecutorial abuse.80 A Jackson v. Denno voluntariness
76. See State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St. 2d 316, 348 N.E.2d 351 (promise of immunity not enough
to render testimony coerced and thus inadmissable; only "violence, torture, or other forms of inhu-
mane coercion" make testimony inherently untrustworthy and violative of due process), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 932 (1976).
77. See, eg., Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. 271 (D.C. R.I. 1981); Johnson v. Hall, 465 F.Supp.
516 (D.C. Mass.), affd, 605 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1979); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662,
335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 348
N.E.2d 351, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932 (1976).
78. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
80. Granting defendants the right to challenge the voluntariness of spousal testimony would
not hinder a witness spouse's opportunity for immunity or lenient treatment. If a prosecutor offers a
witness spouse leniency in return for testimony, the witness would fulfill her part of the bargain by
refraining from invoking her privilege. The defendant spouse could then request a voluntariness
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hearing provides an appropriate procedural mechanism to settle spousal
challenges. Challenges to spousal voluntariness will continue to vest the
spousal privilege solely in the witness spouse, consistent with Trammel.
At the same time, these challenges will preserve a degree of the spousal
privilege commensurate with the balance of societal interests struck by
the Trammel Court.
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hearing. If the hearing showed insufficient voluntariness to invoke the Trammel rule, the court
would bar the testimony. The witness spouse, however, would still be entitled to lenient treatment
because of her offer to testify. The proposed voluntariness challenge would therefore reduce the risk
of prosecutorial abuse by encouraging prosecutors to offer leniency to a witness spouse only if her
testimony were likely to meet voluntariness standards.
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